Open research questions in Game Theory and Applications
219 gap statements mined from Game Theory and Applications papers in our 4.5M-paper local library, which holds 1,541 papers on the topic — drawn mostly from each paper's own stated research gap, future-work, challenge and limitation notes, and its abstract. The ones listed below are a selection still marked open; each names the study that raised it, with a DOI link where the paper has one.
Choosing where to publish on Game Theory and Applications? See the ranked Social Science journals.
What the literature leaves open
The lack of understanding of the rate of convergence of the discounted values. The need for a reformulation of the Markovian persuasion model as a Markov decision process.
The paper identifies a need for a measure-valued MDP approach to derive the value iteration process for stochastic teams.
Optimality of Symmetric Independent Policies Under Decentralized Mean-Field Information Sharing for Stochastic Teams and Equivalence with McKean−Vlasov Control of a Representative Agent · 2026 · DOIThere is a lack of understanding of how strategies and sensitivities coevolve.
The lack of uniqueness results for Markov perfect equilibria in discrete-time finite-player games. The need for selection criteria in cases where uniqueness fails. The importance of understanding the connection between Markov perfect equilibria and the Nash-Lasry-Lions equation.
Future research can study the case where the agent's activities are easily observable. Future research can study the case where the principals' projects are not physically independent from each other.
The paper identifies a gap in the literature regarding the characterization of normal-form games for which there exist Nash equilibria using O(1) randomness.
The gap in the literature is the lack of study on multi-agent systems operating in stochastic environments governed jointly by exogenous factors and by agents' actions. The gap is addressed by the paper's framework and results.
Learning Empirical Evidence Equilibria under Weak Environmental Coupling · 2026Thirdly, summarising a simulation study, we observe that distributed, mixed-strategy protocols can achieve stable and desirable outcomes, modulated by sensitivity to population diversity, limited information, and strategic agent behaviour.
The existing literature, such as the Virtual Observability Refinement of Weber et al. (2004), does not consider the timing of unobserved moves. The paper identifies a gap in the understanding of strategic behavior in games with unique Nash equilibria. The study aims to fill this gap by introducing the concept of General Virtual Observability.
Future research can focus on extending the approximation method to more general cases. Future research can also focus on applying the partitioned strategy structures and incentive designs to various applications.
The gap is that directly solving the cross-coupled nonlinear matrix equations becomes computationally infeasible for large populations. The gap is that the mean-field games' utility dramatically reduces the problems dimension as an approximation, but the computational complexity remains high.
Future research could focus on extending the results to more general setups. The paper suggests that the results could be applied to financial game options.
The paper suggests that future research could explore the application of the framework to other areas of finance. The authors do not provide specific suggestions for future research.
The assumption of complete rationality in traditional game theory models is impossible to achieve. The complexity and limited practicality of the solution process in traditional game theory models.
To explore the application of the results to various domains. To investigate the role of noisy learning in other contexts.
We have completely solved the Avoider-Enforcer game on hypergraphs of rank 2 in all cases, and on linear hypergraphs of rank 3 when Avoider is the last player. A first line of research would be to solve the case where Avoider is the last player on general hypergraphs of rank 3, without the linearity constraint.
The assumption that players can randomize arbitrarily is non-trivial. True randomness might be scarce or costly and humans are known to have difficulty generating truly random sequences.
The authors note that prior work does not account for multi-population heterogeneity and non-rational agents.
The paper assumes that the game mediator has limited resources. The paper focuses on the price of stability, namely on the best equilibrium, and does not consider the price of anarchy.
To study the lower bound on the rate of convergence of the discounted values. To apply the results to other economic fields. To study the behavior of decision makers under uncertainty.
To establish long-time convergence results for discrete-time finite-player games. To develop more general selection criteria for cases where uniqueness fails. To apply the results to specific dynamic games in economics and other fields.
The paper identifies a gap in the literature on the benefits of using a common agent for multiple projects. The paper identifies a gap in the literature on the effect of information sharing on the principals' payoffs.
The coalitional value combines two components: an additive internal interaction term and an external exposure term based on minimal incoming evaluations from outside the coalition. Despite this non-additive structure, the game admits an unanimity decomposition with simple structure. This representation enables the derivation of polynomial-time computable formulas for both the Shapley and the Banzhaf values.
A Tractable Class of Cooperative Games Defined by Directed Networks: Unanimity Decomposition and Shapley Value · 2026Applying the framework to other deployment scenarios. Extending the framework to handle correlated revenues. Investigating the impact of different investment periods on the stability of the grand coalition.
The paper identifies a gap in the existing literature on mean field games with finite state space and common noise. The paper aims to fill this gap by introducing a novel framework for characterizing mean field equilibria.
Most-cited papers in Game Theory and Applications
- Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans · Journal of Political Economy · 1977 · 4,209 citations
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1987 · 2,306 citations
- Decomposition Principle for Linear Programs · Operations Research · 1960 · 1,631 citations
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames · The Review of Economic Studies · 1971 · 1,218 citations
- Discrete Choice with Social Interactions · The Review of Economic Studies · 2001 · 1,122 citations
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement · The Review of Economic Studies · 1992 · 1,013 citations
- Cheap Talk · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 1996 · 956 citations
- A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems · Management Science · 1973 · 861 citations
- Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation · The Review of Economic Studies · 1984 · 811 citations
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality · The Review of Economic Studies · 1999 · 782 citations
Most recent work
- Herdability of Laplacian Game Control Systems · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · 2026
- Sequential Cursed Equilibrium · American Economic Review · 2026
- Equilibrium existence and convergence of congestion games with stochastic disturbances · Science China Information Sciences · 2026
- Evolution of noisy learning in games · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2026
- The role of quantum entanglement in three players cooperative game · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · 2026
- Reviving, reproducing, and revisiting Axelrod’s second tournament · Communications AI & Computing · 2026
- Information Provision and the Curse of Knowledge · Management Science · 2026
- Games on Multiplex Networks · American Economic Review · 2026
- Adversarial bargaining with exogenous shocks · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 2026
- Normal Approximation in Large Network Models · The Review of Economic Studies · 2026
Find a gap in your own Game Theory and Applications sub-topic
This page shows what the Game Theory and Applications literature already flags as unresolved. To narrow it to your specific question, search the Research Gap Finder: the search is free with a free account and lists the papers closest to your topic first. Unlocking that topic (50 credits, charged once) fills the comparison table from our 4.5M-paper local library and writes the gaps from its rows.
Open the Research Gap Finder →