Open research questions in Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
646 unresolved questions extracted from the limitations and future-work sections of 6,076 Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics papers in our library. Each links back to the study that raised it.
What the literature leaves open
The paper identifies a gap in the theory of understanding regarding the agglomeration of justification across conjunctions. It notes that critics of closure think that agglomeration of justification is limited. The paper argues that this limitation is problematic for any adequate account of understanding.
The existing epistemic reparations framework is goods-based and rights-centred. Some authors in the special issue question the adequacy of this framework for genuine epistemic repair.
The paper identifies a gap in understanding the systematic reproduction of agential testimonial injustice. It highlights the need for epistemic reparations in hostile contexts. The gap in understanding the challenges in pursuing epistemic reparations is also identified.
The literature lacks a precise formulation of uniformity theses. There is a lack of analysis of the diversity of 'good' constructions. The paper identifies a gap in the motivation for uniformity theses, which is often based on aspirations of parsimony and metaphysical views about value-bearers.
One challenge is the threat to the assumption that believing a claim because it is the conclusion of a sound argument justifies believing that claim, due to familiar objections to epistemic closure. Another challenge is the need to defend a particular closure principle in the face of these objections.
The gap in the literature is the lack of a defense of the assumption that believing a claim because it is the conclusion of a sound argument justifies believing that claim. This gap is significant because it threatens the common philosophical practice of giving and evaluating arguments.
The existing literature fails to consider the special nature of moral disagreement. There is a need to explore the implications of peer disagreement in the moral domain. The paper identifies a gap in the debate between Conciliationists and Steadfast theorists.
The current literature fails to distinguish between different normative roles of logic. The binary understanding of the normativity of logic is limiting. The paper identifies a need for a more nuanced understanding of the normative autonomy of logic.
Existing solutions do not focus on justification as the central concept. Existing solutions do not provide a way to deal with inconsistent information that reflects the importance of justification. There is a need for a novel solution that takes into account the central concept of justification.
The existing literature does not provide a clear understanding of the semantics of reactive claims; there is a need to incorporate probabilities into the semantic framework to predict the contrast between different cases.
The paper identifies a gap in the existing literature on the Normative Account of ignorance, which relies heavily on linguistic intuitions. The paper argues that these intuitions can be explained on a pragmatic basis, rather than relying on the Normative Account.
The problem of modeling vagueness without sharp boundaries is incredibly hard. The discussion in this paper is limited to the representation of common ground in the context of vague linguistic communication. The resulting view may have to be committed to a view of vagueness that is not unified.
Exploring a non-standard notion of common ground that is itself vague or possesses some other non-standard property. Investigating how to avoid higher-order vagueness related problems in the resulting view.
The existing literature assumes common knowledge of mm ϵ and appearance centering, making common knowledge impossible. There is a need to reject these assumptions and explore alternative models of mutual knowledge.
The paper identifies a gap in the understanding of how inferentialist and expressivist accounts of meaning can be combined, - It notes that the advantages of expressivism are not clearly established, - The paper suggests that a pure inferentialism might be a more viable approach.
The paper identifies the challenge of bridging the gap between traditional and gradable doxastic attitudes. It highlights the difficulty of dealing with conflicting evidence in the context of Dempster's Rule. The paper also notes the challenge of assigning probability masses to subsets of a hypothesis set in a way that is consistent with the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence.
Rethinking the credal basis of rational judgment and suspension: a non-Bayesian threshold view · 2026 · DOIexploring the application of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence to other areas of epistemology - investigating the implications of the non-classical threshold view for rational judgment and suspension
Rethinking the credal basis of rational judgment and suspension: a non-Bayesian threshold view · 2026 · DOIA fuller exploration of the differences between cases where recognition of knowledge shortcoming spurs on aspiration and cases where it does not, - Investigating the factors that limit the manifestation of the desire to understand in our lives
The lack of an adequate account of aspiration that avoids the egoism charge, - The need for a distinction between knowledge and understanding in the evaluative realm, - The gap in understanding how people can work to change their values and achieve personal transformation
The gap is that previous explanations of transparency have overlooked the simple explanation that believing something is thinking it is true. The gap is that the early literature has implicitly rejected the Simple Explanation. The gap is that there is a need for a straightforward and satisfactory explanation of transparency.
The paper identifies the challenge of meta-skepticism, which questions the significance of epistemic concepts. The author addresses the challenge of epistemic pluralism, which suggests that there are many equally coherent epistemic concepts. The paper responds to the challenge of evaluating epistemic concepts in a principled manner, given the lack of a clear basis for privileging one concept over another.
The gap in existing research is the lack of a principled basis for privileging one epistemic concept over another. The paper identifies the need to evaluate epistemic concepts in light of their functional role. The author highlights the importance of considering the role of epistemic concepts in identifying reliable believers, regulating inquiry, and coordinating information exchange.
The literature on rational polarization has focused on belief polarization, ignoring affective polarization. There is a need to examine the rationality of affective polarization. The paper fills this gap by investigating the rationality of affective polarization.
The paper identifies a gap in the existing discussion about the normative significance of personal projects. Prior work has not fully explained why project-dependent reasons have a particular normative force. The paper aims to fill this gap by providing a new understanding of the normative force of personal projects.
The paper identifies a gap in the existing literature on the ethics of intelligence institutions, - it highlights the need for a more nuanced understanding of the complex ethical dilemmas faced by intelligence institutions, - it emphasizes the importance of addressing the tension between the institutionalization of intelligence and liberal-democratic norms and values
Most-cited papers in Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- The case for motivated reasoning. · Psychological Bulletin · 1990 · 6,553 citations
- The Proof and Measurement of Association between Two Things · The American Journal of Psychology · 1904 · 6,234 citations
- Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1961 · 5,586 citations
- A law of comparative judgment. · Psychological Review · 1927 · 3,852 citations
- The processes of causal attribution. · American Psychologist · 1973 · 3,151 citations
- RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND DIVERGENCE OF OPINION · The Journal of Finance · 1977 · 3,101 citations
- Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness · Cognitive Psychology · 1972 · 3,056 citations
- Criteria for assessing the trustworthiness of naturalistic inquiries · ECTJ · 1981 · 2,749 citations
- Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. · Psychological Review · 1983 · 2,635 citations
- The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness · Public Opinion Quarterly · 1951 · 2,430 citations
Most recent work
- Boundary conditioned inference and the logic of generalization in research · Quality & Quantity · 2026
- Ideological neglect of unwarranted trust in science · Theory and Society · 2026
- Double-Checking: In Speech and in Private · Episteme · 2026
- Non-Bivalent Validity · Studia Logica · 2026
- On the tracking account of inferential knowledge · Inquiry · 2026
- How Evidential Pluralism Mitigates Epistemic Injustice in Evidence-Based Evaluation · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · 2026
- Mind the unknown: Conceptual development and validation of the uncertainty mindset · Personality and Individual Differences · 2026
- Secundum cavere, tertium sanare in counterfactual decision-making · American Journal of Epidemiology · 2026
- Understanding, justification and the agglomeration of risks of error · Philosophical Studies · 2026
- The disputed role of knowledge in truth illusions: A critical test based on comparative judgments · Cognition · 2026
Find a gap in your own Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics sub-topic
This page shows what the Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics literature already flags as unresolved. To narrow it to your specific question, run the guided finder — it searches the gap library on demand and checks candidates against 250M+ OpenAlex works.
Open the Research Gap Finder →