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Open research questions in Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence

144 unresolved questions extracted from the limitations and future-work sections of 6,427 Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence papers in our library. Each links back to the study that raised it.

What the literature leaves open

  • During the COVID-19 pandemic, far-right beliefs and attitudes spread as a lack of trust in elites and experts at an all-time high. While Europe’s law-and-order model of countering terrorism has done a fair job of keeping the number of attacks down, it has not stopped them altogether, and European states must face the challenge of how to act regarding far-right extremism and violence. Therefore, a holistic approach to countering violent extremism is recommended. Part of the difficulty in battling far-right violent extremism comes from the misunderstanding of extremism and radicalization. While the identity liberalforum.eu 8 The Rise of Far-Right Violence in Europe European Liberal Forum Policy Paper | December 2022 characteristics are well-known, understanding the role that identity and the individual’s ontological security play before ever being radicalized is one of the key aspects to battling and preventing not only violent acts, but also the prior radicalization of new far-right extremists (Agius et al., 2020; Hogg, 2021). Considering that conspiracy theories and disinformation, especially on the internet, play a key role in the radicalization and penetration of the individual’s identity and sense of ontological security, preventative action must be taken. This is where strategies such as those employed in the Baltics to counter disinformation would be welcome. For example, Estonia’s cyber-security strategy includes media literacy and internet-awareness as high-priority features (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication, 2019). Given that many perpetrators of right-wing violence are younger rather than older, the acquisition of a good foundation for internet literacy and media literacy could possibly prevent radicalization before it even starts. Investing in groups that support these goals is also recommended. Preemptive strategies should be implemented as well. Efforts such as increasing cooperation between social media and internet companies with the government, increasing vetting for prospective military and law-enforcement members, and enforcing zero-tolerance rules related to proven offenders could go along way. The latter two would also be in-line with the current law-and-order counterterrorism model embraced by Europe, which is characterized by inter-state cooperation and integration in the fields of criminal justice and law. This model can be seen in more detail by examining the recommendations and actions planned in the 2020 Counter-terrorism Agenda set forth by the European Commission (“A Counter- Terrorism Agenda for the EU: Anticipate, Prevent, Protect, Respond”, 2020). Finally, reactionary strategies should be observed. These can include prison sentences, but also countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. The difficulty with CVE programs is that there is no solid metric to accurately determine the success of programs; many programs rely on recidivism (someone reverting to criminal or extremist activities and beliefs) as a measurement (Horgan & Braddock, 2010). This can be a problem for various reasons, 1) CVE programs rely on two parties, one of which is the individual being deradicalized, 2) culture and methods of CVE programs differ across cultures; therefore, there are a number of approaches (Cherney & Belton, 2020). That is not to say that CVE programs should be done away with, but that the emphasis should be rather put on preemptive strategies.

    Preventing Violent Extremism through Education · 2026 · DOI
  • Building on the dimensions of societal resilience outlined in the previous section, policy responses to cognitive warfare require the translation of these principles into coordinated policy and societal actions. Resilience must be individual, operationalised across institutional and systemic levels in order to address the multifaceted nature of cognitive threats. At the individual level, media literacy and critical thinking should be integrated into formal education and complemented by public awareness initiatives, thus enabling citizens to navigate complex information environments.

    COGNITIVE WARFARE AND ITS SOCIETAL IMPACT: MANIPULATION, TRUST AND DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE · 2026 · DOI
  • is temporary fall-off occurred not necessarily because those states were incapable of submitting information to the FBI but because they may not have had any hate crimes to report, since the Master File does not account for jurisdictions that do not actually have hate crime cases to report.

    A Comparative Analysis of Hate Crimes Against Asians in the USA, 1996–2022 · 2026 · DOI
  • In this study I have only indirectly touched upon the role of immigration to Western Europe, especially from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This factor has likely influenced antisemitic hostility in the period studied, as anti-Jewish sentiment is widespread in this part of the world and also among Muslims in Western Europe (Webman 2017; Czymara et al. 2025; Jikeli 2015; Tossavainen 2005). The extent of such influence, however, is unclear and understudied. While one 2018 study found “[no] significant connection” between recent MENA immigration and antisemitism in Western Europe (Feldman 2018a), more recent research has documented a posi- tive correlation between Muslim population share and Jews’ exposure to antisemitic violence and harassment in Europe (Enstad 2024). Further research is needed to evaluate the effect of certain kinds of immigration on diverging trajectories of anti- semitic hostility across Europe. With regard to the broader literature on prejudice, the findings carry implica- tions for recent work that distinguishes between two facets of prejudice: generalized What Drives Antisemitic Hostility in the Twenty‑First Century?… 34 Page 32 of 38 J. D. Enstad attitudes toward outgroups, which are more universal and rooted in ideologies of inequality, and specific social prejudices that are more strongly shaped by contex- tual factors (Meuleman et al. 2019; Heyder et al. 2022). The findings reported here support this distinction, as twenty-first-century antisemitic hostility appears to be a prime example of a highly context-specific type of prejudice that is weakly tied to generalized hostility toward minorities. An essential question for future research on prejudice, as stressed by Heyder et al. (2022), is “why the devaluation of specific groups varies over time and over differ- ent countries.” Besides long-term historical and cultural factors, these authors high- light the potential role of more short-term national circumstances such as elite dis- course and media attention. While the present study points to the role of anti-Zionist sentiment in generating or catalyzing antisemitic hostility at the societal level, the specific mechanisms by which such a process might operate remain to be explored, and here the role of media framing—in particular, relating to the Middle East con- flict—is a potential candidate for exploration (Entman 1993; Schemer 2014; Baugut et al. 2025). For example, future studies might use framing experiments to inves- tigate the effects of different narratives about Israel’s role in the conflict on indi- vidual attitudes toward Jews (Beyer and Liebe 2015; Kaushal et al. 2022). Aided by advances in computational text analytics, scholars could also study media coverage cross-nationally and longitudinally, testing effects on observable dynamics of hostil- ity (Guo et al. 2023). Finally, to assess the generalizability of the findings reported here, future compar- ative research should involve a larger number of cases. As in-depth comparative case studies are unfeasible with a larger N, further inquiry could make use of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), a set-theoretical approach that uses Boolean logic to identify patterns of causal conditions across a larger number of cases (Rihoux et al. 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). From a QCA perspective, researchers might start with a small number of in-depth case studies to develop theoretical expecta- tions and identify potential causal pathways in a highly contextualized setting, as in the present study. These insights can then be tested and further developed using a larger number of cases with QCA, examining whether identified patterns hold across a wider variety of contexts. Such an approach would strengthen the basis for making causal claims about the social and political determinants of antisemitic hostility in contemporary societies. Funding Open access funding provided by Institute for Social Research. This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway through Grant no. 302297. Data Availability Data, analysis code, and supplemental materials for this study are deposited in a public repository at Open Scien ce Frame work (OSF).

    What Drives Antisemitic Hostility in the Twenty-First Century? A Comparative Case Study of Germany, Sweden, and Russia (1990–2020) · 2026 · DOI
  • The tension between social cohesion and tolerance of difference in counter-extremism policy is theorized through liberal tolerance frameworks (Rawls, Walzer) but lacks empirical investigation of how this tension actually operates when anti-pluralist and anti-democratic ideologies intersect with genuine experiences of discrimination and marginalization within specific Muslim communities. Qualitative and quantitative research mapping this intersection is needed.

    Between security and belonging: state policy on religious extremism, political values and the politics of identity · 2026 · DOI
  • The paper examines how counter-extremism discourse constructs symbolic boundaries between legitimate community members and security threats, with documented effects on minority civic engagement and political trust, but does not analyze how these identitarian effects vary by different institutional contexts (education systems, policing practices, legislative regimes) or how they interact with pre-existing social cohesion levels in different national settings.

    Between security and belonging: state policy on religious extremism, political values and the politics of identity · 2026 · DOI
  • Figure 4 presents a radicalization pathway model with feedback loops showing how policy responses can amplify or reduce structural drivers of radicalization, but the paper does not specify the quantitative thresholds, temporal dynamics, or community-specific conditions under which particular policy choices trigger these feedback mechanisms. Empirical mapping of these feedback loops across different Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority populations is required.

    Between security and belonging: state policy on religious extremism, political values and the politics of identity · 2026 · DOI
  • The paper contends that effective counter-narratives require 'robust narratives of religious citizenship' and 'recognition of historical injustices' but does not specify what content characteristics, rhetorical strategies, or community validation mechanisms distinguish effective from ineffective counter-narratives to extremist ideology. Comparative analysis of counter-narrative campaigns with measured outcomes on radicalization risk among target populations is needed.

    Between security and belonging: state policy on religious extremism, political values and the politics of identity · 2026 · DOI
  • The paper argues that the 'moderate Muslim' construct is operationalized to privilege individuals compatible with liberal majority norms but provides no systematic data on selection criteria used by states when identifying counter-extremism partners, nor measures of actual community credibility/legitimacy of selected versus excluded religious leaders. Research should quantify the gap between state-preferred 'moderate' interlocutors and those with genuine community standing across different national contexts.

    Between security and belonging: state policy on religious extremism, political values and the politics of identity · 2026 · DOI
  • The paper identifies that counter-extremism policy operates through multiple channels—legislative definition of terrorist organizations, media representations, surveillance patterns, and educational programs—but lacks empirical analysis of how these channels interact and their relative causal weights in producing racialized religious otherness. A systematic comparative study is needed examining the differential effects of each channel on civic engagement and political trust across specific minority communities.

    Between security and belonging: state policy on religious extremism, political values and the politics of identity · 2026 · DOI
  • Since 9/11, few studies have critically assessed how gender-based harassment of veiled (hypervisible) and unveiled (invisible) women both experience distinct forms of verbal abuse (hate speech) and physical violence in public spaces.

    Harassment & Violence Against Muslim Women: Twice Racialized Intersectional Victimization · 2025 · DOI
  • While much has been gained from this research to support victims in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, there is limited research on the overall impact on individuals from different types of attacks, in varied locations, and if there are commonalities to individual impacts from terrorism attacks more broadly across victims.

    ‘I’m laughing and joking, because if not, I would be crying’: Exploring the impact of terrorist attacks on direct victims · 2025 · DOI
  • This paper bridges research on countering violent extremism (CVE), where the role of ethnic and religious diaspora in deradicalization has been understudied and undertheorized, with diaspora and migration literature, which emphasizes diaspora actors as having their own agency and claim-making potential within larger transnational processes.

    Deradicalization of Foreign Fighters and the Agency of Diaspora · 2024 · DOI
  • The research goal is to identify trends related to terrorism that take place in the Russian Federation in the years 2015-2022 (in some parts, the analysis covers the time span between 2015 and 2021, due to lack of data).

    The evolution of terrorism in Russia in the years 2015-2022. Quantitative analysis of the phenomenon · 2023 · DOI
  • Additionally, the lack of consensus on the drivers for the evident escalation in voluntary recruitment into groups such as Al-Sunna wa Jama’a has disrupted existing preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) activities implemented by local and international actors.

    The Role of NGOs in preventing violent extremism: what Mozambique can learn from Kenya and Nigeria · 2023 · DOI
  • Through a discourse analysis of these key documents and a critical engagement with the institutional politics of UNESCO, the paper delineates the discursive constructs of PVE-E that are mobilised and sheds light on the under-researched politics of production that affect the nature of these texts.

    The development of UNESCO’s programmes for preventing violent extremism: educational norms, institutional politics and declining legitimacy · 2023 · DOI
  • Thus, this study fills the gap in the literature on this subject by reviewing the terrorism threat against China after the Cold War from 1989 through 2020, based on the global terrorism database.

    Reviewing terrorism threat on China after the cold war · 2023 · DOI
  • Thus, this article raises a fundamental question of: why has Boko Haram terrorism persisted in Nigeria despite sustained military operations against it? In this article, we argued that because counter-terrorism in Nigeria is lacking in soft approach, it will be difficult for the Nigerian state to defeat Boko Haram insurgency even with military force.

    Hard Versus Soft Measures to Security: Explaining the Failure of Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Nigeria · 2020 · DOI
  • Despite the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) being tasked with being a core policy tool of the European Union and helping to shape its research funding agenda on preventing violent extremism, very little is known about how it operates, the practices and activities it engages with and the discourses it mobilizes to do so.

    'Boosting resilience' and 'safeguarding youngsters at risk': Critically examining the European Commission's educational responses to radicalization and violent extremism · 2020 · DOI
  • For much of the past thirty years US policy has focused on the promotion of democracy and reduction of state‐based human rights violations in the Middle East, yet very few studies have quantitatively examined the effects of these variables on terrorism among Middle Eastern countries.

    Counter‐terrorism policies in the Middle East: Why democracy has failed to reduce terrorism in the Middle East and why protecting human rights might be more successful · 2020 · DOI
  • In the field of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) schools have an important role to play, but precisely how policy actors and educators should best respond to extremism within their schools remains uncertain.

    ‘We have to be really careful’: policy intermediaries preventing violent extremism in an era of risk · 2020 · DOI
  • His argument rests on two central claims: first, that the extent of a person’s liability to defensive harm in virtue of contributing to an unjust threat is limited to the cost that she is initially required to bear in order to avoid contributing, and second, that civilians need not bear lethal costs in order to avoid indirectly contributing to unjust lethal threats.

    Civilian Liability · 2019 · DOI
  • We end by identifying underexplored substantive issues that deserve more attention, such as possibly refining EVIL DONE and to more fully address displacement versus adaptation processes.

    Situational Crime Prevention and Terrorism: An Assessment of 10 Years of Research · 2018 · DOI
  • After over a decade of perhaps the most intense scrutiny a subject of human effort has received in the recorded history of academic inquiry, the shadow of terrorism remains elusive and attempts to capture it under the search lights of intellectual discourse remain for all intents and purposes essentially futile.

    A Formula of Terrorism? · 2015 · DOI
  • Fundamentally speaking, while significant work has been undertaken by leading academics from Europe, Canada, and the USA, relatively little is known about Britain's fusion intelligence centres, in which case the following paper aims to make a valuable contribution to this emerging trend in the policing of domestic affairs, by highlighting the operational protocols and legitimizing narratives that are in use today.

    Unthinking Extremism: Britain's Fusion Intelligence Complex and the Radicalizing Narratives that Legitimize Surveillance · 2015 · DOI

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144 open questions have been extracted from the limitations and future-work passages of 6,427 Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence papers in our library. Each one below links back to the study that raised it, so you can read the original claim in context.

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